

: 3 8 KIDERLSN-WACHTER, THE MAN OF AGADIR

••ou as soon as possible for an exchange of views.** The meeting could hardly take place in Berlin., for Schoen was still in

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tunitr for unobserved talk. The impression made by Kiderlen was so deep -that he was at once begged to draw up a memorandum on the burning question of Anglo-German relations, which Bethmann, despite his ignorance of foreign affairs, realized from the outset was the key to the European situation. He had already initiated discussions with the British Ambassador, and Kiderlen whole-heartedly approved the attempt to undo the mischief of the Bülów regime,

A vesk after the interview he forwarded an elaborate memorandum to Berlin. _ Good relations with England, he began, were undoubtedly one of the principal aims of German policy. Austria would welcome them, Italy would draw nearer to her allies, and Russia would realize the value of German friendship. England was unlikely to - attack Germany or to form an offensive alliance against her. On the other hand. Germany might find the British fleet opposed to her in a conflict originating elsewhere., though this danger was not so great as long as no continental war occurred. The greatest peril was that England, without taking an overtly hostile step, could make things uncomfortable for Germany outside Europe in matters of secondary importance, and perhaps confront her with a new Fashoda in which she must either yield or fight. To avoid such a catastrophe a naval agreement would not suffice, for doubts would exist as to its fulfilment. Germany should declare her readiness to recognize England's naval supremacy as a means to bring the discussion on to the political field. If relations of confidence could be restored Germany could be accommodating in regard to her fleet,

and should
make it clear that she had no desire to weaken
England's
existing friendships. She would be gently
informed that for
some time her policy had been, if not exactly
hostile, at any
rate lacking in friendliness, even when her
interests were not
directly involved. The removal of this obstacle
was essential
if a naval agreement was to be approved by the
Reichstag and
public opinion. British statesmen should not be
frightened
away by too far-reaching proposals at first.
Better a small
success than the failure of a larger project.
Each should
promise not to join a hostile coalition against the
other. The
reception of this proposal would decide how far
the English